Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria by Editors,
[Vol.115
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE-A PLEA
FOR RELEVANT CRITERIA
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court, in an endeavor to
protect the rights guaranteed by the fourth amendment, adopted the
exclusionary rule in the case of Weeks v. United States.1 Almost
fifty years later, after considerable experimentation among the courts 2
and debate among the commentators,' the Court, in Mapp v. Ohio,4
incorporated the exclusionary rule into the due process requirements
of the fourteenth amendment.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police
practices by depriving law enforcement officials of any benefit derived
from such practices.' The hope is that removal of the incentive to
engage in such practices will cause the practices themselves to dis-
appear." Of course, the deterrence would be greatest if complete im-
munity from prosecution were granted in cases where unlawful police
1 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Private letters of the defendant were illegally seized by
federal officers and were admitted in evidence against him in a subsequent federal
prosecution. On appeal from the defendant's conviction, the Court concluded that if
the protections of the fourth amendment were to be meaningful, evidence seized in
violation of them must be inadmissible in prosecutions against the defendant. Id.
at 393.
2 See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (state courts free to adopt or
not to adopt the exclusionary rule), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) ;
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (evidence obtained by state officials and
given to federal officials was admissible despite state official's violation of fourth
amendment right-the "silver platter" doctrine), overruled by Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206 (1960).
3 See, e.g., pro exclusionary rule: Allen, The Wolf Case; Search and Seizure,
Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. REV. 1 (1950) ; Atkinson, Admissibility
of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 25 CoLum. L.
REv. 11 (1925) ; Beisel, Control Over Illegal Enforcement of the Criminal Law: Role
of the Supreme Court, 34 B.U.L. REv. 413 (1954) ; Frankel, Searches and Seizures
During the Truma; Era, 25 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1951) ; Paulsen, The Fourteenth
Amenddment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. R:Ev. 411 (1954).
Con exclusionary rule: Grant, Circumventing the Fourth Anendment, 14 So.
CAL. L. Rxv. 359 (1941) ; Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure,
19 ILL. L. REv. 303 (1925); Plumb, Illegal Enforcement of the Law, 24 Comum..
L.Q. 337, 354-85 (1939) ; Comment, Police Regulation by Rudes of Evidence, 42 MicH.
L. Rv. 679 (1944).
4 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
5 See MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 10 (1950); MAGUIRE, EVI-
DENCE OF GUILT 215 (1959) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 291 (1954) ; Amsterdam, Search
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 388-89 (1964);
Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment on People
vs. Cahan, 43 CALF. L. REV. 565, 579 (1955) ; Maguire, How to Unpoison the Frit
-The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Ride, 55 3. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 307
(1964) ; Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319,
334-35.
6 Granted that the adoption of the exclusionary rule will not prevent all
illegal searches and seizures, it will discourage them. Police officers and
prosecuting officials are primarily interested in convicting criminals. Given
the exclusionary rule and a choice between securing evidence by legal rather
than illegal means, officers will be compelled to obey the law themselves since
not to do so will jeopardize their objectives.
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 448, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (1955) (Traynor, I.).
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conduct has occurred,' or if an affirmative method of punishing the
police were employed. However, use of the exclusionary rule as a
means of controlling police practices is not without social cost. Re-
gardless of the amount of unlawful police conduct which takes place,
it is generally only those cases in which the unlawful conduct dis-
closes strong evidence of guilt which reach the courts. Consequently,
application of the doctrine of exclusion in any particular case usually
means the release of a guilty individual.' This result is wholly un-
desirable and should be minimized whenever possible. Exclusion is
not intended to redress a wrong to the defendant by releasing him,
but is designed only to curb undesirable police conduct." Therefore,
complete immunity goes too far.
This conflict of social interests makes every motion for exclusion
an occasion which places the court on the horns of a dilemma. It
must choose between the lesser of two evils: holding the evidence
inadmissible and permitting a guilty person to go unpunished; holding
the evidence admissible and condoning and possibly even encouraging
unconstitutional police conduct."1
Nonetheless, as to evidence obtained directly through uncon-
stitutional police practices, the Supreme Court has conclusively made
the choice. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,'2 govern-
ment officials illegally seized corporate books and documents of the
defendant. Under authority of the Weeks decision, the defendant
obtained a court order and secured return of the seized documents.
However, while in possession of the seized goods, government officials
had photographed them and used the photographs to obtain a sub-
poena requiring the defendant to produce the originals at trial. The
defendant refused to comply with the subpoena and was cited for
contempt. On appeal the Supreme Court held that the government
could not use the photographs to support a subpoena and reversed
the contempt conviction saying: "The essence of a provision for-
bidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it
shall not be used at all." '3
This decision is generally credited with fathering the doctrine of
"taint" 14 or "fruit of the poisonous tree" as it was later christened.' 5
7 See the rather exhaustive footnote appearing in Broeder, Wong Sim v. United
States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. REv. 483, 516 n.121.
8Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 389 & n.51.
9 Id. at 388-89.
10 See Note, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 570, 574 (1966).
11 See 8 WIGMoRE, EvmENcE §2183 (1940); Comment, Police Regulation by
Rules of Evidence, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 679, 685 (1944).
32251 U.S. 385 (1920).
13Id. at 392.
14.Cf. Note, 114 U. PA. L. Ray. 570, 572 n.16 (1966).
15 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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This doctrine is merely a facet of the exclusionary rule. 6 Essentially,
it is a response to the realization that if police officers are permitted
to use knowledge gained from unlawfully obtained evidence to obtain
the same or other valuable evidence legally, an inducement to commit
such unlawful practices continues to exist.'
Ideally, exclusion should be utilized only to the point where the
increased benefit accruing to society from the additional deterrent
against unlawful police practices equals the detriment incurred by
society due to the release of criminals.' Unfortunately, the amount
of knowledge necessary to find this point of equilibrium appears to be,
in light of what is known about the way deterrence operates, more
"than now seems knowable." 9
The Supreme Court has spoken to the issue in only three major
decisions. In Silverthorne, after stating that evidence gained by
illegal practices could not be used at all, Mr. Justice Holmes was
quick to qualify his words:
Of course this does not mean that facts thus [illegally]
obtained become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of
them is gained from an independent source they may be
proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the
Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way
proposed °
This qualification represents a policy decision that the need for
deterrence does not extend so far as to require affirmative punishment
by making facts unlawfully discovered forever unusable. All that is
deemed necessary is that police officers be deprived of any benefit from
their unlawful conduct. If the government can show that it obtained
the challenged evidence by lawful means and from a source completely
independent of the illegality, the policy is satisfied. An awareness by
police that only information obtained in the proper manner will be
useable, should be sufficient to deter unlawful conduct.
Twenty years later the Supreme Court again spoke to the issue.
In Nardone v. United States,21 a wiretapping case,22 the issue was
16 See Note, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 570, 572 (1966).
17 For purposes of this Comment, a distinction is not drawn between unlawful
police conduct which rises to the level of a constitutional violation and that which
does not The purpose of a "taint" rule is to support the exclusionary rule. Once it
has been determined that exclusion is required, the doctrine of "taint" should be
applicable without regard to whether the exclusion is required by the Constitution
or by rules of law promulgated by courts or legislatures. See notes 22, 47, 53, 95 infra.
18 Professor Amsterdam has called this "the point of diminishing returns of the
deterrence principle." Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 390. See also Barrett, s1spra
note 5, at 583; Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rmv. 454, 457 (1961); Note, 28 U. CHi. L. REv.
664, 666 (1961).
1) Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 390.
2o0 251 U.S. at 392 (1920).
21308 U.S. 338 (1939).
22For purposes of this Comment wiretapping cases treated as equivalent to un-
constitutional search and seizure cases. See note 17 .ipra. See MAGumR, EvmmcE OF
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whether the defendant was entitled to inquire of the prosecution con-
cerning the use to which it had put illegally obtained evidence. Decid-
ing in favor of the defendant, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the Court, reaffirmed the "independent source" doctrine of Silver-
thorne, coined the phrase "fruit of the poisonous tree" and went
on to establish the doctrine of attenuation.
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection be-
tween information obtained through illicit wire-tapping and
the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense, how-
ever, such connection may have become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint.2
This decision was the first to authoritatively recognize that even where
the challenged evidence did not have an "independent source," it was
possible for it to be admissible.
Twenty-three years after the Nardone decision, the high court
again dealt with the problem of the scope of "taint." In Wong Sun
v. United States,26 federal narcotics agents unlawfully entered de-
fendant's home at 6:00 a.m. and arrested him. In the course of
making several statements which were inadmissible against him, the
defendant told the agents the identity and location of a third party.
The agents immediately went to the third party and in due course
recovered narcotics from him which were introduced at trial against
the defendant. Holding that the narcotics were inadmissible as
"fruit," the Court articulated the following standard:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous
tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for
the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt ques-
tion in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of
the primary illegality the evidence to which instant objection
is made has been come at by the exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint." 27
GUILT 220 n.8 (1959); Maguire, How to Unpoison the Fruit-The Fourth Amend-
ment and the Exclusionary Rule, 55 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 307, 309 n.8 (1964). But
see, Broeder, supra note 7, at 542 n.19
3 .
23308 U.S. at 340-41.
24 Id. at 341.
25 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
26371 U.S. 471 (1963). For an analysis of the aspect of Wong Sun dealing
with statements following an illegal arrest, see Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures
and Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area
of criminal Procedure, 1961 ILL. L.F. 78.
27 Id. at 478-88. (Emphasis added.)
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Silverthorne, Nardone and Wong Sun thus establish the three major
standards by which the lines of exclusion generally are said to be
drawn.28
Professor Anthony G. Amsterdam has suggested that since the
information necessary to locate the point of diminishing returns of the
exclusionary rule is unavailable, the goal of providing a deterrent to
unlawful police conduct while minimizing the number of guilty crim-
inals who must be released unpunished might well be accomplished
by flipping a coin and allowing fifty per cent of objecting defendants
to challenge the admission of excludible evidence, while requiring the
other fifty per cent to stand trial without the benefits of exclusion.29
He points out, of course, that no such practice could ever exist.
"[T]hat is not the way in which a court may operate; it appears in-
tolerably arbitrary and would furnish cause for dangerous resentment
by the criminal accused." " He maintains, however, that the doc-
trines of "standing" and "attentuation" which presently govern the
determination of what "tainted" evidence must be excluded are nothing
more than judicial contrivances designed "to serve the flipped coin's
purpose without the flipped coin's manifest caprice." 3
At least with respect to the federal "standing" rules, this would
appear to be so. At present the "standing" doctrine requires that the
defendant have some sort of proprietary interest in the unlawfully
obtained evidence, 32 or that he at least have been legitimately on the
violated premises " to be entitled to object to the admission of any
such evidence. The rationalization for these standing requirements
is that since the exclusionary rule was originally premised on both
the fourth and the fifth amendments, the right to invoke the rule
should be limited, like the right to invoke the personal protections of
28 There are others closely derived from these. See, e.g., Lawn v. United States,
355 U.S. 339, 355 (1958) (evidence was not "derived from") ; United States v. San-
sone, 231 F.2d 887, 891 (2d Cir. 1956) ("fruit of"); United States v. Coplon, 185
F.2d 629, 636 (2d Cir. 1950) (unlawfully obtained information "has not 'led,' directly
or indirectly to the discovery" of the proffered evidence). See also Fahy v. Con-
necticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), holding that a confession induced by confronting the
accused with illegally seized evidence is inadmissible.
29 Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 390.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
3 See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 333 F.2d 409 (10th Cir.), cert. granted,
380 U.S. 527 (1964), judgment vacated, 351 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 949 (1966) ; Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 906 (1964) ; United States v. McDaniel, 154 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1957), aff'd per curiam, 255 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 853 (1958);
United States v. Lester, 21 F.R.D. 376 (W.D. Pa. 1957), and authorities cited therein.
See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding Wong Sun
unable to challenge admissibility of narcotics obtained by virtue of an illegal search
against Blackie Toy because Wong Sun was not a party aggrived). It is interesting
to note that the Wong Suon decision is the first time the Supreme Court has ever
held that a defendant lacked standing to challenge an illegal search. Broeder, supra
note 7, at 540.
33 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, to the party
aggrieved. 4 However, since the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to
deter police practices,35 there is no reason why the effectiveness of the
rule must be diluted by a requirement that the asserter be an aggrieved
individual, or by tying the rule to a limitation peculiar to the privilege
against self-incrimination.3 6
The illogic of the "standing" requirement is highlighted by the
fact that it may well serve to defeat the purpose for which the ex-
clusionary rule exists, and encourage rather than discourage unlawful
police conduct. Once the police are certain that only an aggrieved
individual can challenge the admissibility of unlawfully obtained evi-
dence, they are free, if so inclined, to ransack, coerce and illegally
seize evidence and information from all but the intended defendant,37
knowing full well that they need not fear successful challenge to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained. A particularly offensive aspect
of this result is that the victims of these unlawful invasions will often
be innocent individuals whose only connection with the crime involved
is their proximity to or association with the intended defendant.3
An additional factor indicating the irrationality of the "standing"
requirement is the often unjust and undesirable results which are
obtained by its application. The classic example occurs in the large
conspiracy case where the owner of the seized or violated property,
usually the master conspirator, goes free while his lesser conspirators
are incarcerated because he, not they, owned the seized property or
violated premises.39 This result can be explained only as a compromise,
through which the leader must go free in the interest of deterring un-
lawful police conduct. At the same time, society continues to prefer to
incarcerate the underlings rather than, for the sake of consistency,
free all the conspirators without punishment. Such an approach
strongly indicates that, at least with respect to federal "standing" re-
quirements, Professor Amsterdam is correct when he characterizes
them as nothing more than a judicially contrived substitute for coin
flipping, designed to limit the number of criminals released unpunished
because of the exclusionary rule.
34 See Broeder, .rpra note 7, at 540; Note, Judicial Control of Illegal Search
and Seizure, 58 YALE L.J. 144, 156 (1948). See also FED. P. Cirim. P. 41(e).
35 See Traynor, supra note 5, at 334.
36 See Broeder, supra note 7, at 540; Traynor, supra note 7, at 335; Note, supra
note 34, at 156.
37 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 156 (1931) ; cf. Note, supra note 34, at 158.
38 Official statements from different parts of the country and our field in-
vestigation confirm that these illegal practices are sometimes employed to get
information about an offense from persons who are not suspected of com-
mitting it but only of knowing about it.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note 37,
at 151.
39 See Broeder, supra note 7, at 541; Note, supra note 34, at 157.
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The same can, to a certain extent, be said for some of the lines
drawn by the courts to define the doctrine of "attentuation." The
lower federal courts have been reluctant to abide by the rule laid down
in Silverthorne that before evidence may be used by the prosecution
it must be shown to have an origin independent of the primary il-
legality."0 The illogical exceptions which the courts have fashioned
in circumventing the "independent source" rule 4 offer additional sup-
port for Professor Amsterdam's conclusion.
Implicit in the "independent source" exception to the "fruits"
doctrine is a policy that police not be affirmatively punished for their
unlawful enforcement practices, but only prohibited from receiving
any benefit from such practices. In what seems an obvious effort to
limit the number of criminals released by the exclusion requirement,
many courts appear to have reasoned that, where the illegally seized
evidence would have been obtained by the police absent the illegality,
the police have, in fact, received no benefit from their illegal conduct
and the evidence need not be excluded.'
In Harlow v. United States,43 the defendant was convicted of
bribery and conspiracy. On appeal, one issue was the admissibility
of the products of a search warrant which was allegedly "tainted."
The defendant was a government purchasing agent for European-based"
"post exchanges." He and others were involved in a widespread
conspiracy to solicit bribes. During the course of an investigation
certain incriminating letters written by the defendant to a co-defendant
were illegally seized. From these letters government agents were led
to a co-conspirator who, upon interrogation, confessed and persuaded
a second co-conspirator to confess. These two confessions were
used to secure the challenged search warrant. Despite the connection
between the search warrant and the primary illegality, the court held
that the evidence need not be suppressed. Prior to the illegal search,
a Swiss banker had reported to American officials that the first co-
conspirator had been making large monthly deposits of cash in his
bank. The court reasoned that, suspecting the existence of a bribery
scheme and knowing that the first co-conspirator was involved with
the purchasing agent, the above information would naturally have led
the investigating agents to interrogate the first co-conspirator." The
court concluded that, since it could not be shown that the co-
conspirator would not have confessed under these circumstances, they
could not declare the warrant a product of the illegal seizure of the
letters.45
40 See Note, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 570, 572-73 (1966).
41 See id. at 573.
42 See Maguire, How to Ultpoison the Pndit-The Fourth Amteinment anid the
Exclusionary Ride, 55 J. GCam. L., C. & P.S. 307, 313-17 (1964).
43301 F.2d 361 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 814 (1962).
4 4 Id. at 373.
45 Ibid.
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In Wayne v. United States,48 the police received a call from a
woman informing them that the sister of a friend, the victim of an
abortion, was at the defendant's apartment. The police immediately
went to the defendant's apartment and allegedly 4' entered unlawfully.
There they found the defendant, his lawyer and a deceased woman.
Rejecting a challenge to the testimony of the coroner and the receipt
of an autopsy report as being "fruit" of the unlawful entry, the
court reasoned:
It was inevitable that, even had the police not entered
appellant's apartment at the time and in the manner they
did, the coroner would sooner or later have been advised by
the police of the information reported by the sister, would
have obtained the body, and would have conducted the post
mortem examination prescribed by law. Thus, the necessary
causal relation between the illegal activity and the evidence
sought to be excluded is lacking in this case.4
Both of the above cases have taken the rule that prosecution
evidence must have an independent origin and converted it to read
that where the defendant cannot show that the police officers would
not have discovered the challenged evidence "but for" the illegal police
conduct the evidence need not be excluded.49 Such a rule is com-
pletely at odds with the purposes of the exclusionary rule.50 If the
police will only be deprived of that evidence which the defendant can
show they would not have been able to obtain had they not engaged
in the illegality, they will in no way be deterred from such conduct;
all they will stand to lose is what they would not have otherwise had
and they might gain some advantage if something slips by. Moreover,
the illegal route is often faster and easier than the legally required route.
In United States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc.,51 the defendant was
convicted of making false statements in connection with the purchase
of gold for jewelry manufacture. On appeal the issue was the ad-
46 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963).
47 The issue of the constitutionality of the search was not reached by the court.
Defendant did not claim that the police violated the fourth amendment, but rather that
they had violated the "announcement rule' of Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301
(1958). The difference is not considered significant for the purposes of this Comment.
See note 17 supra. See Broeder, supra note 7, at 511 n.107 (1964), suggesting that the
entry was constitutional.
48 318 F.2d at 209.
49 But see Maguire, upora note 42, at 315-17.
80 Cf. Broeder, supra note 7, at 548 n.217. The rule is also contrary to the usually
accepted rule of burden of proof in such cases.
The burden rested upon the appellant to establish [the primary illegality]
and that there was a reasonable possibility . . . [that such illegality]
tainted . . . [the challenged evidence]. The burden would then pass to the
government to convince the trial court that the evidence was free of taint.
Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 958 (9th Cir. 1966) (Browning, J., dissenting).
61248 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957).
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missibility of evidence obtained by Treasury agents during an al-
legedly unlawful search. The court held the evidence admissible on
the ground that the same evidence had been supplied later to the
Treasury officials by internal revenue agents who were investigating
the defendant's tax returns. Although the passing of such informa-
tion was illegal, the court reasoned that since the defendant failed to
make a timely objection to the use by the Treasury agents of in-
formation gained by this unlawful transfer, any knowledge so gained
became knowledge derived from a legitimate "independent source"
and, consequently, it was irrelevant whether the information was also
gained by an unlawful search by the Treasury agents. 2  While it is
difficult to sympathize with a criminal who is justly punished, it is
equally difficult to condone the result reached by the court. Here, it
used evidence obtained from one illegality to "untaint" evidence ob-
tained from another illegality and, in effect decided that two wrongs
do make a right.
Still another example of artificial line-drawing may be found in
Killough v. United States.53  There, the defendant murdered his wife
and buried her body. In the process of making an inadmissible con-
fession 5 the defendant revealed the location of his wife's body which,
when found, was already two-thirds decomposed and almost un-
recognizable. At trial the defendant moved to suppress the autopsy
report and the coroner's testimony concerning his wife's body.
Despite the fact that knowledge of the body and, consequently, the
coroner's testimony were derived from the defendant's confession,
the court sustained the admissibility of the challenged evidence. The
court reasoned:
It is clear that the evidence of the Coroner and his
assistants in no way connected Killough with the body ....
The mere fact that the body was discovered . . . because
of Killough's disclosure of its whereabouts in his illegally
secured confessions is not determinative. We cannot con-
clude here . . . that the body would not have been dis-
covered "but for" Killough's confession . .. 
.
The fact that within the technical rules of evidence, the mere
existence of the body and the manner in which the victim died "in 
no
way connected" the defendant with the body seems irrelevant. Dis-
52 Id. at 141.
53 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Killough is not a fourth amendment case.
This fact is not considered significant for purposes of 
this Comment. See note 17
supra.
54 Killough made his confession during a period of illegal detention. 
He made
a second oral confession shortly after he was arraigned but 
before he had obtained
assistance of counsel. On his first appeal both these confessions 
were held inad-
missible. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
55 336 F.2d at 934.
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
covery and proof of existence of the body were important to the
police and thus there existed a strong incentive for them to find out
from the defendant where he had buried the body. Since the fact
that the mere existence of the body "in no way connected" the de-
fendant with it was insufficient to remove the incentive for the govern-
ment agents to engage in unlawful conduct to obtain knowledge of
the location of the body, it would seem that such a fact should be
equally insufficient to justify an exception to the exclusionary rule.
With regard to the court's second rationale-that it could not conclude
"that the body would not have been discovered 'but for' Killough's
confession"-the comments made earlier in connection with the dis-
cussion of the Harlow and Wayne cases are equally applicable."6 In
view of the artificial nature of the lines drawn, the decision can be
justified only on the ground that the court did not release a murderer
unpunished.
Lines have also been drawn irrationally in cases where the court-
room testimony was challenged because an illegality was used to
"firm it up," " and in cases where because knowledge of the existence
or identity of the witness was gained by the police through some
unlawful conduct. In Smith v. United States,5" the defendant was
arrested in connection with a certain robbery and placed in a lineup.
56 See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
57Judicial coin-flipping has been prevalent in cases where illegally conducted
lineups involving identification of the defendant preceded courtroom testimony of
witnesses, and apparently conflicting decisions have resulted. Compare Gilbert v.
United States, 366 F.2d 923, 944-46 (9th Cir. 1966) (alternative holding); Carson
v. United States, 332 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 835 (1964) ; Payne
v. United States, 294 F.2d 723, 726-27 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 883 (1961) ;
Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 56-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 873
(1956), with Wade v. United States, 358 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1966), vacated 87 Sup.
Ct. 1926 (1967) ; and with Jacobson v. United States, 356 F.2d 685 (8th Cir. 1966) ;
People v. Stoner, 422 P.2d 585, 55 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1967) (Traynor, C.J.). Some
courts believed that the use of illegally obtained evidence or an illegally obtained
identification to support or make more positive courtroom testimony did not "taint"
that testimony. E.g., Gilbert v. United States, .upra. At least one court indicated
that courtroom testimony cannot be relieved of a prior illegal "firming up." See Wade
v. United States, supra, The intermediate position required a hearing on the issue
of taint. E.g., Jacobson v. United States, supra.
The Supreme Court has recently attempted to resolve the conflict, see Gilbert v.
California, 87 Sup. Ct. 1951 (1967) ; United States v. Wade, 87 Sup. Ct. 1926 (1967),
articulating the following rule:
We think it follows that the proper test . . . is that quoted in Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 . . . , "Whether, granting establish-
ment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made
has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." . . . Application
of this test in the present context requires consideration of various factors;
for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the
existence of any discrepancy between pre-lineup description and the defend-
ant's actual description, any identification prior to lineup of another person,
failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time
between the alleged act and the lineup identification. It is also relevant to
consider those facts which, despite the absence of counsel,- are disclosed con-
cerning the conduct of the lineup.
Id. at 1939-40.
68324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964).
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The victim of the robbery identified other members of the lineup, but
did not identify the defendant. Thus, there was no longer probable
cause to hold him. Nonetheless, he was detained overnight and was
placed in several lineups the next morning. As a result of these
lineups, the defendant was interrogated in connection with a robbery
different from that for which he had been arrested. This second rob-
bery involved a felony-murder charge. Shortly thereafter, the de-
fendant gave an inadmissible confession in which he mentioned the
existence and first name of an eyewitness to the crime. Following up
this statement the police located the witness who, after expressing some
reluctance, finally agreed to testify against the defendant. At trial the
defendant challenged the use of this testimony as "fruit" of his unlawful
detention. The court of appeals refused to hold the testimony in-
admissible. "No case has ever been cited to us in which the testimony
of an eyewitness or factual witness has been excluded because his
identity was discovered as a result of disclosures made by an accused
during detention violative of Rule 5(a) .... ," 5 The court
continued:
The fact that the name of a potential witness is disclosed to
police is of no evidentiary significance, per se, since the living
witness is an individual human personality whose attributes
of will, perception, memory and volition interact to determine
what testimony he will give."°
Shortly after Smith v. United States, the District of Columbia
Circuit did an almost complete about-face. In Smith v. United States,61
police conducted an unlawful search of the defendant's car. In so
doing they discovered a stolen transmission in the trunk. Without
removing the transmission, they jotted down its serial number. The
officers later obtained a search warrant; however, when they returned
with the warrant the transmission was gone. Questioning the de-
fendant, they learned that he had delivered the transmission to one
Dean. Locating Dean, they learned that the transmission had been
sold to Donaldson and Harvey. The police then called Donaldson's
home and spoke to his father who stated that Donaldson and Harvey
had purchased the transmission and would bring it to the police.
Donaldson later called Harvey and told him that the transmission
was stolen, but that the police did not have Harvey's name. They
brought the transmission to the police. The court held that their
testimony must be excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The
court distinguished the first Smith case on the ground that there the
eyewitness
59 Id. at 881.
60 Ibid.
61344 F.2d 545 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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initially refused to testify and "only after reflection and the
interaction of these faculties of human personality ['will,
perception, memory and volition'] did [the witness] even-
tually relate to the jury the events of the night of the
killing." 62
The combination of these two decisions has created a line in the
application of the "fruits" doctrine which is based not upon the nature
of the police conduct, nor upon the nature of the crime involved, but
upon the vagaries and peculiarities of the individual witnesses and the
promptness with which they respond to a governmental request for
assistance.' How such a line between "tainted" and "untainted"
evidence can be considered anything but "coin flipping" is difficult
to perceive."
Thus, there is considerable support for Professor Amsterdam's
conclusion. However, even granting that the courts are merely "flip-
ping" a coin, it may be argued that an individual criminal who is denied
the benefit of having evidence excluded cannot claim that his rights
have been violated. The exclusionary rule has only one purpose-
to deter unlawful police practices. This is a public purpose, not a
private one. Criminals are permitted to act as "private attorney
generals" only because it is necessary to the successful operation of the
exclusionary rule. It is not necessary that all criminals be allowed
to so act.
On the other hand, a basic tenet of our society is that all men
are equal in the eyes of the law. This principle is an essential require-
ment of our concept of justice. Consequently, if one criminal is
permitted to reap the benefits of acting as a "private attorney gen-
eral," then either all criminals should be afforded a similar oppor-
tunity or the distinctions drawn between those who are and those
who are not must be supported by rational and relevant considerations.
The lines which courts have drawn do not meet this standard. The
decisions have failed to focus on the proper issue-will exclusion
serve to deter future unlawful police practices?
62Id. at 547. (Brackets in original.)
6 3 See Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1964) ; cf. McLindon
v. United States, 329 F.2d 238, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also Note, The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Cohmbia Circuit: 1964-1695 [sic] Term,
54 GEo. L.J. 185, 227-28 (1965).
64 For contrary decisions holding testimony excludable where the identity of the
witness is obtained through a police illegality, see People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317,
118 N.E.2d 277 (1955); People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E.2d 997 (1942); cf.
United States v. Klapholtz, 230 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924
(1956) ; United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd, 316 U.S. 114
(1942). Moreover, the absence of any discussion in Wong Sun concerning the volun-
tariness or reluctance of Jonny Yee in turning over narcotics may cast some further
doubt upon the relevance of such considerations to the issue of "taint"
1148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.115:1136
One possible alternative for the administration of the scope of
taint doctrine would be to give wide discretion to the trial judge.'
He could approach each case individually, taking into consideration
the quality of the local police, the need for deterrence in his par-
ticular jurisdiction and the likelihood that exclusion in the particular
case would produce a deterrent effect. However, this possibility
presents too great a danger that society's desire to secure convictions
of the guilty is likely to produce so many exceptions to the rule as
to actually destroy its effectiveness. 6 Moreover, the danger of actual
or apparent arbitrariness makes the suggestion impractical." 7 This
does not, however, require a reversion to some form of judicial coin
flipping. There exist several relevant criteria which appear to be
playing a part in determining where the lines of exclusion are drawn.
In Nardone v. United States,' Mr. Justice Frankfurter articulated
the belief that admitting only evidence obtained through a totally
"independent source" (as set out in Silverthorne) might be permitting
the scope of taint to spread too far. He stated that, "sophisticated
argument may prove a causal connection between information ob-
tained through illicit . . . [police practices] and the Government's
proof." " However, suggested Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "As a matter
of good sense . . . such connection may have become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint." " The standard "so attenuated as to dis-
sipate the taint" can be an extremely relevant criterion when viewed
in light of the purpose for exclusion. Deterrence is the object of
exclusion and only such exclusion as is likely to produce deterrence
is justified. Given the Silverthorne rationale--that the deterrence is
to be accomplished not by making evidence unlawfully obtained sacro-
sanct but simply by removing any gain 71-- it is possible to derive a
meaningful and relevant line of "attenuation" from the Nardone test.
The purpose of depriving the government of any gain is to
remove any incentive which exists toward the unlawful practice. The
focus is forward 72-to prevent future violations, not punish for past
ones. Consequently, where the chain between the challenged evidence
and the primary illegality is long or the linkage can be shown only by
"sophisticated argument," exclusion would seem inappropriate. In
such a case it is highly unlikely that the police officers foresaw the
105Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939): "A sensible way of
dealing with such a situation . . . ought to be within the reach of experienced trial
judges."
06 See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 378, 391 n.58 (1964) ; Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 454, 458 (1961).
07 See Amsterdam, stupra note 66, at 391 n.58.
68 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
69Id. at 341.
70 Ibid.
71 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1919).
72 See Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 Dunm L.J. 319,
335 (1962).
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challenged evidence as a probable product of their illegality; thus it
could not have been a motivating force behind it. It follows that the
threat of exclusion could not possibly operate as a deterrent in that
situation. Absent this, exclusion carries with it no benefit to society
and should not prejudice society's case against a criminal.
A similar analysis holds true for challenged evidence which is
used for some relatively insignificant or highly unusual purpose.
Under these circumstances it is not likely that, at the time the primary
illegality was contemplated, the police foresaw or were motivated by
the potential use of the evidence and the threat of exclusion would,
therefore, effect no deterrence."
A number of cases appear to have applied such a standard. In
Walder v. United States,4 the defendant was tried on a charge of
illegal possession of narcotics. Taking the stand in his own defense,
the defendant testified that he had never possessed, sold or transferred
narcotics in his life. Several years earlier, in an unrelated offense,
federal agents had illegally seized narcotics from the defendant. For
the purpose of impeaching the defendant's credibility, the prosecution
had two federal narcotics agents testify to defendant's prior possession.
Despite a challenge that the testimony was "fruit" of the officer's
illegal seizure, the evidence was held admissible and the Supreme Court
affirmed its use for that purpose. The decision is clearly justifiable
under the preceding rationale.7 The possibility of using illegally
obtained information for the purpose of challenging the defendant's
credibility in a trial involving a subsequent, unrelated and, at the time,
uncommitted crime offers no inducement to engage in the unlawful
police practice. Therefore, exclusion of the evidence will not deter
future violations by police. Absent this there is no justification for
excluding the evidence.
Unfortunately, the court in Walder did not utilize this reasoning.
The Walder court based its decision upon an abhorrence of "letting
the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance
on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility." 76 This
is unfortunate because it authorizes the use of illegally obtained in-
formation, not only in a subsequent and unrelated case, but also in
the same case as that involving the primary illegality. The problem
arose in Tate v. United States,77 where the defendant was arrested for
robbery and, during an allegedly unlawful detention, made an in-
admissible confession. At his trial, the defendant took the stand and
made exculpatory statements concerning his presence at the scene of
the crime and his acquaintance with an alleged confederate. In re-
73 Cf. Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rv. 454, 457 (1961).
74 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
75 See text accompanying notes 71-72 supra.
76347 U.S. at 65.
77283 F2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
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buttal, the state offered the testimony of police officers to the effect
that the inadmissible confession which the defendant had made was
contrary to the exculpatory testimony given by the defendant. The
testimony, although clearly fruit of the allegedly unlawful detention,
was held admissible on the authority of Walder. Here, however, the
evidence was used in the same case in which the primary illegality was
involved. Unlike the unforeseeability of preventing a defendant from
perjuring himself in a future and unrelated crime, the prospect of
preventing the defendant from testifying favorably in his defense in
the present case might well provide enough temptation to provoke
unlawful police conduct. Moreover, in Walder, the challenged evi-
dence, at worst, put before the jury only evidence of a predisposition
to commit the crime charged. The challenged evidence in Tate gave
evidence of guilt of the crime charged, a tempting and desirable piece
of evidence which should have been excluded in order to remove the
incentive toward future police illegalities.
Even though the use to which the evidence obtained by the pri-
mary illegality is put is not unforeseeable, as in the Walder situation,
exclusion should be refused where the illegality is of small value in
producing the challenged evidence. In Warren v. Hawaii,"s a police
officer was electrocuted by an anti-raid, device in a brothel. The
device was subsequently seized by police, allegedly without proper
authority. Before the trial, the device was used to refresh the memory
of witnesses who testified to its existence. The testimony was chal-
lenged because of the use of the device. However, the court held the
testimony properly admissible. A similar result was reached in
Barkley v. United States." There, the defendant confessed to a
murder during a period of unlawful detention. At trial he admitted
the crime but claimed an insanity defense. His confession was ad-
mitted against him, but only as to the issue of his sanity at the time
of the act. The admissibility of the confession for this limited purpose
was sustained.
Both of these decisions are justifiable under the suggested analysis.
In each case the challenged evidence was not used for its normal
purpose, but for some unusual and relatively minor purpose. As
such, the threat of exclusion would add little deterrence to the primary
illegality and therefore should not be imposed.
Thus, from the Nardone test, at least two relevant criteria may
be derived by which courts may legitimately stem the spread of "taint"
and limit the number of criminals released by the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine. The third and perhaps most important criterion is the
offensiveness of the police conduct.80 Since the purpose of the ex-
78 119 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1941).
79 323 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
8o See Amsterdam, sitpra note 66, at 391 n.58; Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 454,
455 n.10 (1961).
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clusionary rule is to deter undesirable police conduct, where that
conduct is particularly offensive the deterrence ought to be greater and,
therefore, the scope of exclusion broader. An application of this
fact is implicit in the test adopted by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun
v. United States -- "Whether . . . the evidence . . . has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality .... 8 2 Moreover, a
number of lower court decisions show a tendency to take into con-
sideration the offensiveness of the police conduct in determining how
far to extend the scope of taint.
In Parts Manufacturing Corp. v. Lynch, 3 stolen goods were
illegally seized by federal authorities. The defendant subsequently
secured a court order for their return. However, during the period
in which they were in possession, the federal officers made an itemized
list and turned it over to the owners of the goods. Consequently,
when they were returned to the defendant a state sheriff was waiting
with a writ of replevin and immediately seized them. While the
goods were stored in the sheriff's warehouse, the federal officers
obtained a search warrant and seized them again. In holding that
the goods constituted admissible evidence, the court found that the
information used in the affidavits which supported the search warrant
also had an independent source, and that the only information sup-
porting the search warrant which was obtained solely from the original
illegal search was knowledge of the present location of the goods.
Concluding that that information was insufficient to compel exclusion
of the goods as "fruit of the poisonous tree" the court noted:
An attempt was made to conform to the requirements of the
search warrant statute. A strong prima facie case of dealing
interstate in stolen articles is presented. It is too much to
hold that in order to obliterate the original illegal seizure an
otherwise exemplary procedure must be thrown over because
the government did not close its eyes and lose track of the
stolen parts.8
A similar tendency is apparent in People v. Gorg.8
5 There, nar-
cotics seized in an unlawful search of the defendant's rented basement
by police officers who were called to the scene by the defendant's
landlady were held admissible, despite the fact that the landlady had
no right to enter the basement nor to authorize the police to do so.
In so holding the court said:
"A criminal prosecution is more than a game in which
the Government may be checkmated and the game lost
81371 U.S. 471 (1963).
821d. at 491. (Emphasis added.)
83 129 F2d 841 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 674 (1942).
841d. at 843.
845 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P2d 469 (1955).
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merely because its officers have not played according to the
rule." . . . and when as in this case the officers have acted
in good faith with the consent and at the request of a home
owner in conducting a search, evidence so obtained cannot be
excluded merely because the officers may have made a reason-
able mistake as to the extent of the owner's authority.s6
In United States v. O'Brien,"' the good faith of an officer appears
again to have influenced the court. There, the defendant was arrested
and charged with receiving stolen goods. A truck with the de-
fendant's name on it had been found loaded with the stolen goods. The
arresting officer asked the defendant if he had the keys to the truck.
The defendant was reluctant to offer the keys, stating that he thought it
might look bad for him if he were found to have them on his person.
The officer told the defendant that if he gave the keys to him, he [the
officer] would report that he found them on the street. The de-
fendant gave the officer the keys. In holding that the officer could
testify that the defendant had possession of the keys to the truck, the
court reasoned that since the police had lawfully arrested the de-
fendant, they could simply have searched him and found the keys.
Moreover, "No right of . . . [the defendant] has been violated by
this ruse of Officer Mclnerny who, incidentally, reported, as he
promised . . . [the defendant] that he would, that he had found
the keys." I8
Just as the courts appear to be favorably impressed by good
police conduct, they seem equally aware of bad police conduct. In
Wrightson v. United States,"9 the defendant was illegally arrested and
placed in a lineup. He was identified by the robbery victims and
shortly thereafter confessed. In ruling the confession inadmissible as
"fruit of the poisonous tree," the court said:
[T] he tendency of police officers to arrest people without
warrants and without probable cause is a matter of vast
public importance, and it has been of such importance since
Colonial days. Courts cannot put a stamp of approval upon
actions of the police when the officers, challenged by an
accused, fail or refuse to demonstrate compliance with the
rules which circumscribe their authority. Certainly the
police have been warned enough in these respects, by the
86 45 Cal. 2d at 783, 291 P.2d at 473. In terms of the substantive issue involved,
reasonableness of the search without a warrant, Gorg may be overruled by Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). It is used only as an indicator of likely
judicial reaction which is relevant to the purpose behind the exclusionary rule. See
note 17 supra.
87 174 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1949).
8sid. at 346.
89 222 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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Supreme Court of the United States, by this court, and by
many other courts.0
Although these several cases have articulated a sensitivity to the
offensiveness of police conduct as a determinant of the proper scope
of taint in each case, it would seem that there are probably many more
courts which have reacted to it without giving evidence of that fact.
None, however, with the possible exception of the Gorg court, has
gone so far as to articulate the offensiveness of the police conduct in
each case as a proper and legitimate criterion for deciding individual
"fruit of the poisonous tree" issues.9  This is unfortunate, since it is
one of the few criteria by which lines of exclusion can be drawn
legitimately without resort to judicial coin flipping9
90 Id. at 558. A similar statement may be found in United States v. Paroutian,
299 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1962). Suppressing evidence allegedly tainted by unlawful
searches, the court said:
There is no showing of any reason why the few hours necessary to secure
a warrant could not be spared. . . . Here the only permissible inference is
that the agents were careless or feared they had not amassed sufficient evi-
dence to support issuance of a warrant. These facts demonstrate the recur-
rent need to suppress logically relevant evidence if acquired unlawfully, even
where it may mean a criminal will go free. For in these circumstances the
agents willfully or negligently ignored judicial admonitions, constantly re-
iterated ....
Id. at 488.
91 However, see the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Lumbard in United States
ex rel. Stovall v. Denno, 355 F.2d 731, 742 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 87 Sup. Ct. 1967
(1967), where he states: "I am particularly unwilling to exclude all identification in
this case because Mrs. Behrendt's testimony seems reliable and because alleged police
improprieties were unintentioial and technical." (Emphasis added.)
92 "What should be of primary concern [of the exclusionary rule] is . . . the
grievousness of official lawlessness." Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty
States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 335 (1962).
The cases also disclose a tendency by the courts to react to a fourth criterion-
the offensiveness of the crime involved. Judge Berger expressed abhorrence at
extending the exclusionary rule to free a murderer in Killough v. United States, 315
F.2d 241, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (dissenting opinion). "It is shocking to me that
upon such tortured grounds the court reverses the conviction of this man who has
confessed to a bizarre and brutal murder." Id. at 265. (Miller, J., dissenting).
"[W]here either the offense or the illegal procedure involved is minor, the decisions
seem to have been influenced by that factor." Note, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 454, 455 n.10
(1961). Prior to Mapp, a Maryland statute excluded evidence discovered by unlaw-
ful searches in misdemeanor cases, but not in felonies. Hall v. Warden, 313 F.2d
483, 490 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963). This is an admittedly
relevant criterion considering the tension between the need for deterrence and the
desire to incarcerate criminals; however, it seems unadministrable under the present
state of knowledge. When the crime is most offensive is when this criterion would
call for admission, and yet it is when the crime is most offensive that police are most
likely to violate rights in an attempt to apprehend the criminal and, consequently,
the time when deterrence and, therefore, exclusion are most needed. Since the neces-
sary knowledge to reconcile these competing interests in any particular case is not
yet available, this criterion is not yet useable.
19671
